Lebethe's 'half-truths' exposed as court dismisses harassment case

In a devastating blow to her credibility, SAMRO CEO Annabell Lebethe has had her harassment protection order bid against SAMRO member, Owen Ndlovu thrown out of court.

Magistrate MA Thirtle did not mince words, Lebethe's application relied on half truths and incomplete information.

This is not just a legal loss, it's a damning indictment of a CEO willing to bend the truth to silence opposition.

Lebethe's false statements.

The court's central finding was not simply that Lebethe failed to prove harassment. It was that she obtained the original order without telling the court the full story.

"The interim order was obtained on half truths and incomplete information that was indeed detrimental to the Respondent," the magistrate found.

Under the Protection from Harassment Act, a person can ask the court for an interim protection order before the other side is even told about the case or given a chance to respond. Because only one side is heard at that stage, the law requires the person applying for the order to be completely honest with the court and to disclose all the important facts, even those that may weaken their own case.

The magistrate found that Lebethe failed to meet that duty in three important respects.

First: she told the court Ndlovu had come to her office looking for her on 5 March 2025.

"The Applicant was incorrect in stating that the Respondent came looking for her as this was not the case," the judgment reads.

The evidence showed Ndlovu:

• never went to her office.

• never asked for her and

• never mentioned her.

• Lebethe was not even in the building that day as she was working from home.

Second: she "failed to disclose that the Respondent was clear that it was for his protection when speaking to the witnesses". Ndlovu was carrying a firearm that day, tucked in his waistband.

Both witnesses, Lebethe's own personal assistant Naseema Yusuf and a Mr Clinton Hornet, testified that,

• he never drew it,

• never brandished it, and

• told them explicitly he was carrying it for his own protection because he felt intimidated by building security.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, she

"failed to mention that the Respondent's business lease was also terminated prior to 5 March 2025 and insinuated that it was only terminated on the 5th of March 2025 when the gun was exposed".

The court found that Lebethe created an impression that Ndlovu's lease was cancelled because of the gun incident. However, the evidence showed that SAMRO had already decided to terminate his lease on 27 February 2025, days before the incident took place.

Her own witnesses contradicted her version of events, the only two people who witnessed the events on 5 March told the court they were not threatened or intimidated, seriously weakening Lebethe's case.

Yusuf's own email to Lebethe, sent at 14:37 that afternoon and quoted in the judgment, reads: "He did not threaten me but he did show me it was tucked in his pants."

In court, she "did indicate to the court that she was not intimidated, and that the Respondent did not ask her anything about the Applicant,"

Hornett testified that Ndlovu came to his office to discuss contractual issues. He said that Lebethe "was not mentioned or discussed," and that "the Respondent did not intimidate him."

The judgment also quotes an internal email Lebethe sent to SAMRO's legal team on 6 March 2025, the day after the incident, and the same day Ndlovu filed a spoliation application against SAMRO, recording advice that "a harassment/intimidation case will be strengthened by the protection order."

The court said that "the police were only contacted on the 6th of March 2025, when the Respondent handed in his spoliation application, and not on the 5th of March 2025, when it was reported to the Applicant."

The strongest card in Lebethe's hand was a WhatsApp message Ndlovu sent her on 12 December 2024: the message reads:

"I know you and the Chair have become very close.... If you don't take Chola out..... We will take you and the Chair out, soon."

The court accepted this message and said it "can be construed as Harassment" but found it was a once-off that did not meet the accepted threshold of repeated conduct or serious distress.

The magistrate found that the message was not a threat of physical violence. Instead, she interpreted the words "take out" to mean removing someone from their position at SAMRO. The judge noted that "Chola" is a staff member in SAMRO's legal department and said it would make no sense to interpret the message as a call to physically harm him.

The bigger fight: the Funduzi report

The judgment reveals that the court battle is part of a much bigger power struggle inside SAMRO. At the heart of that conflict is the Fundudzi forensic report, commissioned in 2023 to investigate the alleged misappropriation of funds.

The report, which was released only to SAMRO members, continues to divide the organisation and, according to the court, "is still a point of contention" at Annual General Meetings.

The sequence of events outlined in the judgment is difficult to ignore.

• On 20 September 2024, Ndlovu emailed the SAMRO board complaining that his "right to dignity has been dragged in the mud by SAMRO personnel" and demanding an urgent meeting.

• On 8 December 2024, during SAMRO's Annual General Meeting (AGM), Ndlovu called on members to vote the board out of office. Lebethe, as SAMRO's Chief Executive Officer, sits on that board.

• On 24 February 2025, he opened a corruption case against Lebethe and the board chairperson.

• Three days later, on 27 February 2025, SAMRO terminated his company's service agreement and business lease.

• On 5 March 2025, the dispute escalated. Ndlovu arrived at SAMRO's offices carrying a licensed firearm, and on the same day he received another letter confirming the cancellation of his lease.

• The very next day, on 6 March 2025, Ndlovu obtained a rule nisi in a spoliation application after SAMRO blocked his access to the building. In that separate case, the court found that SAMRO had acted unlawfully. It ruled that the organisation should have reported the firearm incident to the police instead of taking matters into its own hands.

The court said that "The respondent's conduct was unlawful" and the alleged firearm incident "could have been cured by reporting the incident to the police as opposed to the respondent taking law into their own hands."

• On 7 March 2025, Lebethe applied for the harassment order.

In his court papers, Ndlovu put it bluntly:

"To date she has launched 4 cases against me in a space of 5 months showing a desperation to remove me from SAMRO so she can protect the thieves that stole the money."

He described himself as a whistle-blower and said the protection order "is used to intimidate a whistle-blower of which the court has a responsibility to protect". He said was "victimised for a political battle" over "evidence of corruption amounting to R60 Million".

The court did not endorse those characterisations. It expressly held that: "The court cannot conclude that there is an abuse of process in this matter".

The court declined to touch the defamation question, finding only that the podcast comments were

"merely a discussion on the report on corruption and the management of it"

rather than harassment.

What SAMRO's own constitution says?

The Public Dispatch has examined SAMRO's amended Memorandum of Incorporation, the constitution that binds the organisation, its board and its members.

SAMRO's own rules provided a way to deal with disputes like this. The organisation's Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) contains procedures that both Ndlovu and SAMRO's leadership either relied on, ignored or may now have to answer for.

Ndlovu's conduct is a good example. Clause 32.1 of the MOI requires every member to act in the best interests of SAMRO, avoid doing anything that could harm the organisation, and cooperate with its directors and staff.

If SAMRO believed that Ndlovu's December WhatsApp message or his public statements breached those rules, the MOI already provided a clear solution. Under Clause 32.2, the board has the power to suspend a member who fails to comply with the MOI or SAMRO's Governance Rules.

In other words, if SAMRO believed Ndlovu had broken its rules, it could have dealt with the matter through its own internal disciplinary processes rather than relying on court proceedings

The judgment contains no indication that SAMRO's board ever activated its own internal disciplinary process before turning to the courts.

Instead, days after Ndlovu opened a corruption case against the CEO and the board chairperson, SAMRO cancelled his company's lease and service agreement. A court later ruled that those actions were unlawful, finding that SAMRO had taken "the law into their own hands."

Lebethe then turned to the courts in her personal capacity, seeking a harassment order against Ndlovu. That application has now also failed after the magistrate found that the interim order had been obtained on 'half truths and incomplete information'.

SAMRO chose blunter instruments over its own constitution.

SAMRO's own constitution also puts Ndlovu's comments at the December AGM into a different light.

Clause 17.2.3 provides that a director "shall cease to hold office... if she/he is removed by Ordinary Resolution" a simple majority of members.

Calling for a vote to remove the board is not an act of rebellion under SAMRO's constitution,it is the constitutional machinery itself. Whatever else may be said about Ndlovu's methods, that particular act was one the MOI contemplates.

But the MOI cuts both ways. While it sets out members' obligations, it also establishes the standards of governance and accountability expected from those leading the organisation.

As CEO she serves as an executive director which means every director, accountability mechanism in the MOI applies to her.

Under clause 17.2.4.1.3, allows the rest of the board, excluding the director concerned, to decide whether a director has neglected or failed to carry out their duties. However, before any decision is made, the Companies Act requires that the director be notified of the allegations and given a fair hearing under section 71(4).

Under clause 17.2.8, two-thirds of her co-directors may remove her.

Under clause 17.2.3, the members may also remove her by ordinary resolution.

And under clause 20.3.1, the board that appointed her as CEO "may from time to time remove" her, subject to her contract.

None of these mechanisms were invoked. Instead, the dispute played out through litigation.

The court's findings now place the spotlight firmly on SAMRO's board. It is the board's responsibility to consider issues that could affect the organisation's governance, integrity and reputation. Whether it will act on this judgment is no longer a hypothetical question, it is one the board may now have to answer to its members.

Another important provision is Clause 4.5 of SAMRO's MOI. It reflects the organisation's status as a public benefit organisation and makes it clear that SAMRO must not be run to benefit its leaders or employees personally.

The clause states that "no activity will be intended to directly or indirectly promote the economic self-interest of any fiduciary or employee of the organisation, otherwise than by way of reasonable remuneration."

In simple terms, SAMRO's resources and activities must be used to serve the organisation and its members, not the personal interests of those who manage it. While the judgment does not find that this clause was breached, it reinforces the high ethical standards expected of those entrusted with leading the organisation.

The harassment application was brought by Lebethe personally, not SAMRO, she was the complainant.

Yet the judgment shows the organisation's machinery moving in support of it, her personal assistant's email, the internal legal department's involvement, and correspondence with SAMRO's external attorneys strategising that "a harassment/intimidation case will be strengthened by the protection order".

One important question remains unanswered, who paid for Lebethe's legal case? Was it Lebethe herself, acting in her personal capacity, or did SAMRO cover the legal costs?

The question matters because the magistrate has now found that the interim protection order was obtained on "half truths and incomplete information."

If SAMRO funded litigation brought by its CEO in her personal capacity, members are entitled to know on what authority that decision was made, who approved it, and whether it complied with the organisation's governance rules.

Why this matters beyond two individuals.

The magistrate also relied on an important High Court judgment that warned against the misuse of protection order proceedings.

In Watson v Adams and Others [2025] ZAGPJHC 436, the High Court cautioned that the Protection from Harassment Act is intended to protect genuine victims—not to be used as a weapon in other disputes. Quoting that decision, the magistrate said:

"If persons feel themselves at liberty to obtain orders on false information and without notice this will affect the very purpose that the Act was enacted to curtail... Such conduct brings the legal system into disrepute."

That is the context in which this judgment must be read. The findings raise questions that SAMRO's board and its members are entitled to ask.

A CEO's credibility is one of an organisation's most valuable assets. When a court finds that an interim order was obtained on "half truths and incomplete information," it raises serious questions about the judgment, transparency and candour expected from the person leading a member-owned organisation responsible for collecting and distributing artists' royalties.

A CEO is expected to act with honesty, openness and integrity, not only when dealing with the organisation's members, but also when appearing before a court. Those same values are at the heart of good corporate governance and are especially important in an organisation like SAMRO, which exists to protect the interests of its members.

The judgment comes as SAMRO members continue to demand answers about the Fundudzi forensic report, an issue that the court notes has remained a source of dispute at successive Annual General Meetings.