How NAC turned public funds into a private slush fund

For six years, the National Arts Council of South Africa (NAC) has been warned.

The Public Protector has written to it. The Auditor-General has flagged it in writing. The Minister of Sport, Arts and Culture has sent letter after letter. Parliament's Portfolio Committee on Sport, Arts and Culture has called it in at least six times. Its own staff went on strike and petitioned Parliament.

Not one senior official has faced a disciplinary outcome.

The Public Dispatch reviewed parliamentary records, ministerial letters, Auditor-General findings, court papers, payment records and the NAC's own written admissions. Together they show a public entity where consequence management, a legal duty under the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), has stopped working.

The documents reveal an institution in which serious questions about public money, appointments, conflicts of interest and internal controls repeatedly collide with the same obstacle, no consequence management.

Meanwhile, the same names keep resurfacing.

• Julie Diphofa, the arts development manager who has repeatedly served as acting chief executive.

• Reshma Bhoola, the acting chief financial officer since 2021.

• Puleng Lesala, the project manager Diphofa appointed without advertising the post.

• Princess Celenhle Dlamini, council chairperson from 2021 to 2024 and now deputy chairperson, and

• Bongani Tembe, a council member who also heads an orchestra that has received about R134.7 million through the NAC.

Some hold the same posts they held when the allegations began. Two are in line for permanent appointment.

None of them has been found guilty of wrongdoing by any court or tribunal. The Public Protector's investigation is still open. The NAC says a private investigation by law firm Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr cleared Diphofa and Bhoola. It has never released that report.

The Auditor-General's warning

In its audit of the NAC's 2024/25 financial year, the AG raised a material finding on consequence management. It could not find evidence that disciplinary steps had been taken against officials who incurred fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

This is because the NAC had never investigated that expenditure.

Director-General Dr Cynthia Khumalo reported the finding to the Portfolio Committee on 21 November 2025. The NAC's interim finance manager, Charl Drinkwater, told the same meeting the finding also covered an employee paid without a signed employment contract in 2022/23.

The law leaves no room for this. The PFMA makes the NAC council, as the accounting authority, responsible for discipline.

Section 51(1)(e) says the accounting authority must take effective and appropriate disciplinary steps against any employee of the public entity who:

(i) contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of this Act;

(ii) commits an act which undermines the financial management and internal control system of the public entity, or

(iii) makes or permits an irregular expenditure or a fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

Section 51(1)(b)(ii) adds that it must take effective and appropriate steps to:prevent irregular expenditure, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, losses resulting from criminal conduct, and expenditure not complying with the operational policies of the public entity.

The Act defines fruitless and wasteful expenditure as spending "which was made in vain and would have been avoided had reasonable care been exercised."

Every annual report must also account for what was done. Section 55(2)(b) requires it to include particulars of:

(i) any material losses through criminal conduct and any irregular expenditure and fruitless and wasteful expenditure that occurred during the financial year;

(ii) any criminal or disciplinary steps taken as a consequence of such losses or irregular expenditure or fruitless and wasteful expenditure;

(iii) any losses recovered or written off.

Millions on lawyers, nothing on accountability

The NAC has not been shy of disciplinary action but it has aimed it downwards. At the same November 2025 meeting, NEHAWU shop steward Galaletsang Molefe told MPs the NAC had spent about R14 million on legal fees between 2021 and 2025. He said about R9 million of that went on disciplining staff.

At the time, the NAC was refusing to pay staff about R900,000 in performance bonuses for 2019 to 2022. That dispute led to a strike, and later to the council's dissolution.

Council chairperson Eugene Botha promised the committee a report on the legal spending. There is no public record that it was delivered.

The employee it would not take back

One case shows where the legal money goes. Tshepo Mashiane was Gauteng's provincial representative on the council and its spokesperson during the 2021 PESP crisis. He resigned from the council in June 2022 and was appointed programme manager on 10 November 2022.

He was stopped on his first day. Last year in September he said:

"I was handed a resignation letter, and told my appointment was irregular because council wasn't aware of it."

Mashiane challenged his dismissal through the NAC's internal appeal process and an independent appeal chairperson overturned the dismissal. In May 2023 the Chairperson directed that he be reinstated. The NAC refused.

The dispute proceeded through the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and again he won. In August 2023 the commissioner found the NAC had suspended him without cause, leaving him "in limbo", and ordered his reinstatement. They refused instead they took that award on review.

On 14 September 2026, the Court dismissed the review in National Arts Council v Mashiane (JR1718/23), finding the commissioner's decision was one a reasonable decision-maker could reach. The NAC had appointed Moodie & Robertson.

The judgment further reveals that Mashiane had not been paid salaries despite the internal appeal outcome overturning his dismissal and his efforts to tender his services. The NAC's conduct therefore raises questions extending beyond the original appointment.

• Why was the internal appeal outcome not implemented?

• Why did the dispute continue through further proceedings?

• What has the litigation cost the public entity?

• And what action has been taken to prevent a similar dispute from consuming public money again?

Public Dispatch understands that the NAC's legal costs on the Mashiane's matter is way above R6 million. The question is whether NAC exercised reasonable care in managing the dispute and its financial consequences.

In Parliament in November 2025, Mmolotsane cited the Mashiane case costing about R1.5 million. The NAC has consistenly refused to divulge the actual cost of Mashiane's case.

The NAC has its own case. A report it relies on says Mashiane's appointment was not fair and transparent, and was arranged by some council members without the knowledge of the full council or DSAC. Then-Minister Nathi Mthethwa had said it was undesirable for a former council member to move into a management post at the entity he oversaw. But the NAC has repeatedly yet they kept litigating.

The contrast with Pueng Lesala's irregular appointment is stark. An advertised post filled by a former council member has been fought for four years. An unadvertised post filled on an acting CEO's say-so has never been challenged by the council.

With the CCMA award now upheld, the legal spending may itself meet the PFMA's definition of fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The PFMA defines fruitless and wasteful expenditure by reference to money spent in vain that reasonable care would have avoided. But eitherway the Labour Court judgment makes the demand for an explanation more urgent. The public should not have to rely on insiders to estimate what an extended employment dispute has cost.

The award is not optional. Section 143(1) of the Labour Relations Act says:

"An arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding and it may be enforced as if it were an order of the Labour Court in respect of which a writ has been issued, unless it is an advisory arbitration award."

The Minister warned the NAC

In August 2025 the Public Protector sent the NAC a notice about allegations of graft. The NAC answered with a consolidated response and an annexure dated 30 July 2025.

Minister Gayton McKenzie was not satisfied. In a letter to the council in September 2025, he wrote:

"While the council denies the allegations, many of the responses are unsupported by documentary proof. And, in several instances, they contain admissions of factual events that require independent testing."

He said the allegations could not be "dismissed as wholly vague or frivolous". He recommended an independent investigator, appointed in consultation with his department. He advised that Diphofa, interim CEO at the time of the events in question, and Bhoola, interim CFO, be placed on precautionary suspension on full pay "with immediate effect".

He wrote:

"This step would not be a disciplinary sanction but a neutral, time-bound measure to protect witnesses and ensure access to records."

He also asked that implicated council members be recused "from any human resources, supply chain management or investigation-related matters."

That request was not honoured.

Two months "special leave"

The council met on 15 September 2025. It did not suspend the two executives. It resolved to place them on special leave, starting only once an investigator had been appointed. That happened on 20 November 2025, the day before the council was due in Parliament.

NEHAWU told MPs that staff had not been told of any special leave. EFF MP Eugene Mthethwa said the two officials still had their tools of trade. ANC MP Matsholo Mmolotsane pointed out that Diphofa had been listed to present to the committee that week. Botha told the committee the council had decided, without external legal advice, that the officials would stay in their posts until the investigation formally began. He said no lawyer on the council had given a legal opinion because no legal question was before it.

What the law says

The Minister's power over the NAC comes from section 63(2) of the PFMA:

"The executive authority responsible for a public entity under the ownership control of the national or a provincial executive must exercise that executive's ownership control powers to ensure that that public entity complies with this Act and the financial policies of that executive."

The Act defines ownership control to include the power

"to appoint or remove all, or the majority of, the members of that entity's board of directors or equivalent governing body"

The Minister's letter was framed as a recommendation. According to the NAC Act, the council (NOT THE MINISTER) is the employer, therefore the council was entitled to decide. However it was not entitled to decide irrationally, or to delay without reason. Its members owe fiduciary duties under section 50(1)(b) of the PFMA to:

"act with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interests of the public entity in managing the financial affairs of the public entity."

There was also no legal obstacle to acting at once. In Long v South African Breweries (2019), the Constitutional Court held that a precautionary suspension on full pay is not a disciplinary sanction and does not require a prior hearing.

The investigation that cleared them

The council appointed Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr to investigate. In a written response to The Public Dispatch, Botha said:

"A petition, however many signatories it carries, is not evidence of wrongdoing. The appropriate mechanism for investigating allegations of this nature is an independent forensic process, not public pressure. Such a process was in fact conducted by Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr. That investigation found no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of either Ms Diphofa or Ms Bhoola. Council considers those findings authoritative. We will not suspend individuals on the basis of allegations that a formal investigation has already examined and not substantiated."

The council has refused to release the report. It has refused to release the terms of reference. It has not said whether CDH was asked to examine every allegation before the Public Protector, or whether DSAC was consulted on the appointment, as the Minister had asked.

On the Lesala appointment, the council said CDH "did not find evidence of conduct warranting disciplinary or further action." That is a statement about discipline. It is not a finding that the appointment followed the law.

What the law says

The PFMA does not allow an accounting authority to hide behind its own paperwork. Section 50(1)(c) requires it to:

"on request, disclose to the executive authority responsible for that public entity or the legislature to which the public entity is accountable, all material facts, including those reasonably discoverable, which in any way may influence the decisions or actions of the executive authority or that legislature."

The Constitution sets the standard for every organ of state. Section 195(1)(g) says transparency

"must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information".

The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) provides a framework through which records held by public bodies may be requested, subject to its lawful grounds for refusal.

None of these provisions means every investigative document must automatically be published in full. Legitimate privacy, confidentiality and legal restrictions may need to be considered. But the existence of a private investigation does not make its contents permanently beyond public scrutiny.

The NAC should disclose the report or provide a properly reasoned explanation of the legal basis for withholding it, including whether redaction could protect genuinely confidential information while allowing the findings to be scrutinised. Until then, the public is being asked to accept the council's characterisation of a report it cannot read. That is not meaningful transparency.

The NAC is a public body under the PAIA. A report paid for with public money is not private by default.

Who chose Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr?

Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr is one of South Africa's largest corporate law firms. It has also worked for the Minister's party. In August 2025, McKenzie announced that the Patriotic Alliance had appointed CDH to investigate its deputy president, Kenny Kunene, over his presence at the home of a murder accused. McKenzie said he had tasked Eugene with sourcing the firm. The PA's legal head is Eugene Botha.

In September 2025, CDH cleared Kunene. Business Day later questioned that probe in an editorial, saying it had not captured an earlier visit by Kunene to the same house.

Two months after the Kunene clearance, the NAC council, chaired by Botha, appointed CDH to investigate Diphofa and Bhoola.

These events do not establish that CDH acted improperly in either investigation. Nor do they prove that the NAC investigation was compromised. But they raise legitimate questions about appointment processes and perceived independence.

• Who selected CDH for the NAC investigation?

• Was the firm appointed through a competitive or otherwise documented process?

• What were its terms of reference?

• What did it charge?

• Did the department participate in the selection, as the minister had requested? And

• what safeguards were used to protect the investigation's independence?.

Four investigations, repeated controversies and no consequences

CDH was not the first. In December 2021, Minister Nathi Mthethwa listed four investigations into the NAC in a written reply to DA MP Veronica van Dyk:

Diphofa is named in three of the four. In the Gobodo matter, as arts development manager, she was charged with approving funding for the Lalela project while it was classified as expired, and with approving its payment without a proper funding application. She was exonerated and returned to work.

The pattern is consistent. Senior managers investigated over funding decisions were reportedly cleared. There is no public record that the R511,452 paid irregularly to former council members was ever recovered.

Those are not minor omissions.

If public money was paid irregularly, the institution should be able to explain whether the payments were lawful, who was responsible, whether recovery was pursued and why any outstanding amount remains unrecovered. A succession of investigations is not proof of accountability. Accountability requires demonstrable outcomes.

Diphofa, Lesala and the appointment that still needs answers

Julie Diphofa has worked at the NAC for more than 20 years. She has served several times as acting CEO and held the position from August 2022 until June 2025. In May 2025, she was re-elected deputy chairperson of the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies.

Her institutional experience and professional standing are relevant. So are the unresolved questions about decisions made while she exercised executive authority. One concerns Puleng Lesala's appointment as project manager in the arts development unit.

In August 2025, Diphofa, then interim CEO, appointed Lesala without following the ordinary HR process. According to sources the position was not on the NAC's approved structure and had not been advertised. Diphofa did not deny authorising the appointment.

At that time she said:

"The position was authorised by me, as interim CEO. Puleng is an astute professional with 17 years of experience. This position did not need to be advertised, as it was an internal temporary secondment to the project management role to fulfil a specific functional requirement. The position has been filled on a temporary basis."

EFF MP Eugene Mthethwa said at the time:

"Proper HR processes should have been followed, and this matter warrants further investigation."

More than a year later, Lesala remains in the position. She has presented PESP figures to Parliament, including on 25 September 2026, when she told MPs that beneficiaries are told that "as long as there's money that you've paid to anyone you need to count that as a job".

The NAC Act gives the council the power to appoint employees. Section 15(1)(a) provides that the council may appoint the number of employees it considers necessary to perform its functions.

Section 13(4) provides that an employee appointed to act as CEO has the powers and duties of that office while acting. The council may also delegate powers under the conditions set out in section 19.

The critical question is whether a valid delegation authorised Diphofa to create or fill the position in the circumstances described, particularly if the post was outside the approved structure and was not advertised.

Diphofa's explanation is that the appointment was a temporary internal secondment to meet a specific operational requirement. That explanation should be tested against the approved staff structure, the applicable HR policy, the relevant delegation and the appointment records.

The council has not publicly produced the material needed to resolve the question. The issue is not whether Lesala is qualified or whether the NAC needed someone to perform the work. It is whether the institution followed the rules governing the use of public money to employ staff.The council cannot settle that question simply by saying its investigator found no conduct warranting disciplinary action.

The busary: R42,906 and a family connection allegation

In 2020/21 the NAC awarded an individual bursary, funding number 3368801, to Alexander Appolis. Payment documents are dated 13 March 2021. Appolis is alleged to have since married Diphofa's daughter. Diphofa has not confirmed this.

At the time, Diphofa was acting CEO and also arts development manager, the unit that handles bursaries. Proof-of-payment records submitted to Parliament show Diphofa and Bhoola as the final approvers. The records show a payment of R21,453 and a Wits University fees statement of about R28,000. The NAC's 2020/21 annual report records R42,906 paid to Appolis. That is exactly twice R21,453, which suggests two instalments totalling about R14,900 more than the fees statement.

In Parliament, MK Party MP Sthembile Nkosi questioned the payment and referred to the University of Johannesburg. Bhoola confirmed the payment was made. She said it went through council approval, due diligence in the arts development unit and finance compliance checks, and that it complied with the PFMA. She declined to discuss the marriage, calling it a personal matter.

Acting CEO Lebogang Mogoera told the same meeting that Diphofa had raised the matter with him in April. But The Public Dispatch understands she raised it only after this publication sent questions on 30 July 2026 NOT in April. Diphofa did not respond to those questions.

The issue is not whether Appolis deserved a bursary. It is whether the application was assessed impartially, whether any relevant personal interest was disclosed, and whether officials with a conflict withdrew from the decision-making process.

In June 2020, the Public Protector's Report 125 of 2019/20 found maladministration at the NAC and directed the institution to establish a declaration-of-interest register for employees within 30 days. In March 2023, the NAC told Parliament that the register had been completed.

The bursary was approved in March 2021, after the Public Protector's order. The questions are therefore specific:

• was a relevant interest declared?

• what did the register record?

• who considered the application?

• and what controls prevented a conflict from influencing the decision?

Section 57 of the PFMA requires officials to ensure that financial management and internal controls operate within their areas of responsibility and to take effective steps to prevent irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

No finding of wrongdoing against Diphofa or Bhoola should be inferred from the payment records alone. But neither should the public be expected to accept assurances about compliance without the records needed to verify them.

PESP: The programme that exposed the NAC's governance failure.

The Presidential Employment Stimulus Programme (PESP) is the NAC's biggest job. It is also where its worst crises began. In 2021 the first rounds collapsed. The NAC awarded far more than the R300 million it had, then tried to cut grants already signed with about 600 beneficiaries.

The High Court ordered it to pay the National Arts Festival R3.4 million within 72 hours. Artists occupied its Newtown offices for weeks. The CEO and CFO were suspended, and an investigation later found that five council members had been "enmeshing themselves in operations" and adjudicating PESP applications.

In April 2021, it was reported that four of the 18 new council members were linked to organisations awarded PESP money. Diphofa became acting CEO in March 2021, after those suspensions. As arts development manager, she still heads the unit that runs PESP. When MPs asked about PESP reach on 25 September 2026, acting CEO Lebogang Mogoera handed the detail to her.

A closed list of beneficiaries

The NAC has repeatedly refused to say who gets the money. Diphofa has constantly refused to release the PESP beneficiary lists. In October 2025 the NAC refused to name its PESP 6 adjudicators, citing safety and integrity. In August 2025 a sourced said:

"The call for PESP 6 will be issued soon, but the beneficiaries are already predetermined. A handful of these companies are directly connected to board members."

Artists and MPs have repeatedly alleged that PESP money reaches companies and individuals with little or no record in the arts. In November 2025, MK Party MP Gezani Kobane told the NAC he never saw the claimed jobs on the ground in villages such as Giyani and Malamulele, and accused it of "cooking the story".

The Public Dispatch asked the NAC on 27 September 2026 how many PESP 6 and PESP 7 beneficiaries are companies whose main business is not the arts, and whether it checks shared directorships across applications. It has not answered.

The Public Dispatch is separately examining a PESP 7 recommendation of R461,000 for a festival that may not have taken place. Questions are pending. The fact that a grant recipient is a company does not itself establish impropriety. Nor does a company's principal business automatically determine whether it can lawfully deliver an arts project.

The real questions are whether applicants met the published criteria, whether adjudication was impartial, whether conflicts were identified, whether projects were delivered and whether expenditure was verified.

The NAC should be able to answer those questions using its own records.

The NAC admitted it does not independently veryfy the jobs

The NAC's own controls are thin. At the 25 September 2026 hearing, the director-general described Auditor-General findings of unverifiable and duplicated beneficiary ID numbers in PESP at the NAC and the NFVF. Asked whether the NAC independently verifies the jobs it reports, an official replied:

"The answer is no."

That answer should alarm anyone concerned about the integrity of an employment programme funded with public money. A programme cannot credibly claim to have created jobs if its administrators cannot demonstrate that the reported employment has been independently verified.

The NAC Act requires the council to keep databases of people and organisations in the arts. Section 6(1)(e) empowers it to:

"establish, compile and maintain databases, including, but not limited to, databases of persons, organisations, institutions, equipment and facilities connected with the arts."

Mogoera told MPs such a database "doesn't exist". Without one, the NAC has no reliable way to tell an artist from a company formed to catch a funding round.

What the law says:

The Act requires public input into who judges applications. Section 11(5) says:

"The Council shall appoint persons to an advisory panel on the basis of nominations obtained from the public as prescribed."

A panel whose members cannot be named cannot be shown to have been publicly nominated. The Act also bars insiders from the money.

• Section 4(10) says council members "shall not be eligible for grants from the Council during their term of office".

• Section 11(10) applies the same rule to panel members.

Under the PFMA, section 51(1)(a)(i) requires the council to maintain "effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal control". Paying beneficiaries whose identity numbers cannot be verified is the opposite.

NAC's own admissions that required follow-up

Some of the most serious facts did not come from whistleblowers. They came from the NAC. In his September 2025 letter, the Minister wrote that "the council's own Annexure A, dated 30 July 2025, records admissions of factual events which bear further scrutiny". He listed them:

• Duplicate payments of R183,063 during the first round of the Presidential Employment Stimulus Programme (PESP 1), and a further duplicate batch payment of R40,000 during PESP 2.

• The transfer of R65 million into a trust account. The NAC explained it as following a National Treasury instruction. The Minister said the placement needed independent confirmation.

• The approval of projects that the adjudication panels had not recommended.

• Allegations of interference in HR appointments, including an interim arts development manager and a graphic designer, which the NAC dismissed without supplying HR policies or appointment records.

• The appointment of interim finance manager Charl Drinkwater during a ministerial moratorium, which the Minister said had not been adequately explained.

There is no public record that any duplicate payment was recovered, or that anyone was disciplined for it.

What the law says

The NAC Act has its own recovery clause. Section 18(1) says that if an employee caused the council loss because he or she:

"(b) is or was responsible for an irregular payment of money of the Council or for payment of such money not supported by a proper voucher; … the accounting officer shall determine the amount of such loss or damage, and may order that person, by notice in writing, to pay to the Council, within 30 days from the date of such notice, the whole or any part of the amount so determined."

The R65 million

The R65 million transfer deserves particular scrutiny because it involves a substantial sum and a disagreement over the authority for moving it. The NAC's explanation is that the transfer followed an instruction from National Treasury. The minister said independent confirmation was required. The transfer took place in November 2021, when Bhoola was acting CFO. She allegedly moved the money without the authority or knowledge of the then CEO.

McKenzie's 2025 letter stated that Diphofa and Bhoola were specifically named in allegations concerning payments and financial oversight. The NAC's explanation and the allegation about the transfer's authorisation must be assessed separately.

Section 16(5) of the NAC Act provides:

"The Council may invest any unexpended portion of its funds with the Corporation for Public Deposits."

The existence of that power does not, by itself, establish that every particular transfer was authorised correctly. The essential questions are documentary:

• what instruction did National Treasury issue?

• to whom was it addressed?

• what transaction did it authorise?

• who approved the transfer?

• and what accounting records show the money's destination and subsequent treatment?

The Public Dispatch has not established that the transfer was unlawful, nor that the allegation against Bhoola has been proven. But five years after the transaction, the absence of a publicly available documentary explanation leaves a serious accountability gap.

Bhoola remains acting CFO, and the council has sought to proceed with filling the CFO position permanently. The public should not have to choose between an unverified allegation and an institutional assurance. The relevant records should settle the question.

R134.7 million, One council member and an orchestra

Bongani Tembe was deputy chairperson of the NAC council from 2021 to 2024. He remains a council member. He is also chief executive of the Mzansi National Philharmonic Orchestra (MNPO), which has received approximately R134.7 million through the NAC between 2021 and 2026, according to the funding figures reviewed by The Public Dispatch.

The NAC says it acted as a conduit for the funding, following directions from the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture. Tembe has told The Public Dispatch that the money was a board-approved allocation rather than a disbursement, and that a signed funding schedule records his recusal from decisions involving orchestras with which he is associated.

The Public Dispatch requested that schedule. It has not been provided. These explanations matter. If the NAC was merely administering a department-directed allocation, that affects how responsibility for the funding decision should be assessed. But it does not eliminate the need to document the allocation, identify the decision-makers, establish the applicable conflict-of-interest safeguards and account for the money.

The minister's September 2025 letter identified concerns involving council members and alleged interference in operational, supply-chain and HR matters. Staff involved in the NEHAWU petition said Tembe, Dlamini and former member Stephanie Da Silva were among those named.

McKenzie subsequently indicated that the implicated council members did not necessarily need to be suspended but should be included in the investigation. No finding of wrongdoing against Tembe has been established by the information reviewed for this article.

Nevertheless, the scale of the orchestra funding and Tembe's overlapping roles demand documentary transparency. The NAC Act is explicit about conflicts of interest. Section 8(5) provides:

"A member of the Council shall not vote or in any manner participate in the proceedings at any meeting of the Council nor be present at the venue where such a meeting is held, if, in relation to any matter before the Council, he or she has any interest which precludes him or her from performing his or her functions as a member of the Council in a fair, unbiased and proper manner."

Section 50(3) of the PFMA requires members of an accounting authority to disclose direct or indirect personal or private business interests involving themselves or specified close relations in matters before the authority, and to withdraw from proceedings when those matters are considered, unless the authority determines that the interest is trivial or irrelevant.

Section 50(2)(b) prohibits the use of a position for personal gain or to improperly benefit another person.

These provisions make the documentary record crucial:

• Was Tembe's interest declared?

• What decisions came before the council?

• Was he absent from relevant deliberations?

• Who approved the allocations and payments?

• What role did DSAC play?

• What conditions governed the use of the money?

The public should not be required to infer the answers from the amount allocated or the identity of the organisation receiving it.

Tembe wrote to this reporter describing the inquiries as "tantamount to interfering with the operations of the national orchestra" and instructing her to "desist". The Public Dispatch declined.

The funding of a national orchestra with public money is a legitimate subject of public-interest journalism. Questions about the use of public funds cannot be dismissed simply because they concern the operations of a cultural institution. The decisive evidence remains the funding schedule, the allocation records, the payment records and the conflict-of-interest documentation.

The Mthethwa legacy: How the old Council's problem carried foward.

Much of what McKenzie now confronts at the NAC was put in place under his predecessor. Nathi Mthethwa was Minister of Arts and Culture from 2014, and of Sport, Arts and Culture from 2019 to 2023. He died in Paris on 30 September 2025 while serving as ambassador to France. He cannot answer for these decisions. This article sets out the record, not his motives.

• The 2021 council: The council that took office on 1 January 2021 was appointed under Mthethwa, with Celenhle Dlamini as acting chairperson and later chairperson, and Tembe as deputy chairperson. In March 2021 it suspended the CEO and CFO and installed Diphofa and Bhoola in their places.

• The orchestra: The MNPO was registered with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission on 28 September 2021. In November 2021, about R54 million was channelled to it through the NAC, under a memorandum providing for payments of R41,557,256 and R10,389,314. Tembe, its CEO, was deputy chairperson of the NAC council. The then CEO of the Cape Town Philharmonic, Louis Heyneman, called the national orchestra "a personal folly of Nathi Mthethwa".

• Mashiane: Mashiane alleges that Mthethwa instructed the NAC to remove him. Questions to Mthethwa went unanswered before his death.

• The panels: Charles Mabaso, a former DSAC chief director implicated in a 2019 funding controversy, sits on the NAC's multi-discipline panel for a term starting in 2025. Committee chairperson Joe McGluwa called it a matter of integrity.

• Downtown Music Hub: In a 2021 reply to Parliament, Mthethwa said his department had given just over R60 million to the Downtown project since 2008, directly or through the NAC. McKenzie halted the funding in 2025 pending an investigation.

The continuity that the Minister himself questioned

Section 4(6)(b) of the NAC Act provides for three non-provincial members to be re-elected for a further three-year term at the end of the council's term, subject to the statutory restrictions. When the new council took office in January 2025, Dlamini, the former chairperson, became deputy chairperson. Tembe remained on the council. The continuity was legally structured, but it also preserved the presence of members associated with the earlier governance period.

In his September 2025 letter, McKenzie wrote:

"This leads to a possible breakdown in trust between me, as the Executive Authority, and anyone who was on the council at that time. In particular the former chair, now a continuity member."

The minister's concern does not establish wrongdoing by the continuing members. It does, however, show that questions about trust and institutional continuity were already part of the formal correspondence. The same council later became involved in the dispute over the permanent appointments and the minister's request to pause recruitment.

The result is a governance system in which the minister's authority is constrained and undermined. The council's composition is also contested and senior management decisions remain vulnerable to further legal challenge.

A Minister with limited room to manoeuvere

The October resignations by board members altered the council's composition. Three of the departing members, Botha, Clarke and Masemola were appointed in 2025. Botha and Clarke were named in a leaked dossier concerning Patriotic Alliance linked board appointments. Botha voted to respect the minister's request on 12 October. The remaining non-provincial members include Dlamini and Tembe, who continued from the Mthethwa-era council.

The Minister cannot appoint a replacement council while the Ngwenya interdict stands. He cannot assume the council's appointment powers merely because he disagrees with its decisions. His August letter asking for a halt to permanent appointments was framed as a request, and the council's statutory appointment powers must be considered alongside the litigation and its own governing rules.

But the department has other oversight responsibilities.

Section 38(1)(j) of the PFMA requires a department's accounting officer, before transferring certain funds to an entity, to obtain written assurance that the recipient has effective, efficient and transparent financial-management and internal-control systems or to impose conditions and remedial measures where such assurance is unavailable.

That provision does not automatically entitle the department to withhold every transfer to the NAC. Its application depends on the nature of the transfer and the statutory framework governing it. It does, however, demonstrate that financial oversight is not limited to appointing or dissolving boards. The NAC Act also provides for a council member to be removed by the council for sufficient reason, subject to the minister's approval.

The practical challenge is to exercise the available powers lawfully, document the reasons for intervention and avoid replacing one governance crisis with another. McKenzie's position is weakened by the absence of a formal board-effectiveness assessment process, the litigation surrounding the dissolution and the unresolved questions about appointments within his own portfolio.

His weakness at the NAC is partly inherited and partly of his own making.

Lebogang Mogoera: The Department's repeated answer to institutional crisis

When DSAC needs someone to run a troubled entity, it keeps sending the same official. Lebogang Mogoera is a DSAC chief director. His substantive post is Chief Director: Infrastructure Support. He has led the department's sport infrastructure work since before the 2019 merger and has briefed Parliament on the municipal sport infrastructure grant.

Since 2024 he has been seconded again and again. His secondments have included the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF), the NAC and Robben Island Museum.

The repeated secondments raise questions about institutional continuity, the duration of acting arrangements and the extent to which DSAC relies on the same senior official to stabilise multiple entities.

What Parliament has heard from Mogoera

Mogoera's appearances before Parliament have produced several important admissions and explanations.

In August 2026, he told MPs that Diphofa had raised the bursary issue with him "in April". The Public Dispatch understands that the disclosure came only after this publication sent questions on 30 July. That chronology remains a matter requiring clarification from the people involved.

On 25 September 2026, Mogoera acknowledged that the NAC's arts database doesn't exist. When asked about PESP's reach, he described visiting a project in the Free State to check whether funded projects "are really there". He then handed detailed questions about PESP to Diphofa and offered written answers.

That division of responsibility deserves scrutiny. Diphofa's knowledge of the programme may be extensive, but the acting CEO remains responsible for ensuring that the institution can substantiate its performance claims.

There is also evidence that Mogoera attempted to address staff concerns during an earlier period at the NAC. NEHAWU told Parliament in November 2025 that he had proposed benchmarking staff salaries against those at comparable entities and had found NAC staff underpaid.

Robben Island Museum: Another troubled institution

Mogoera was the museum's interim CEO by February 2026, when he signed an R8.3 million partnership with Paris Musées, backed by France's development agency. The museum's 2025/26 financial year ended with a second consecutive adverse audit opinion. The Auditor-General said it could not quantify the museum's irregular expenditure because of the condition of its financial statements.

Separately, an investigation report concerning ticketing, dated January 2025, reportedly reached the current CEO only in September 2026. The available information does not establish whether either matter fell within Mogoera's direct responsibilities or whether any adverse finding was made against him.

The wider issue is institutional: what corrective action followed the audit findings, who was responsible for implementing it, and what oversight did the department exercise?

NAC under Mogoera's watch

Mogoera was interim CEO when the NAC submitted its consolidated response to the Public Protector on 30 July 2025. The minister later said that many of the responses were unsupported by documentary proof.

Since June 2026, he has served as the NAC's acting CEO, and for a period as acting accounting authority. The Public Dispatch sent questions to him and the NAC,

• on 30 July,

• 27 September,

• 16 October and

• 21 October 2026

He never bothered to respond

The authorisation and documentary basis for PESP 7 decisions made during his tenure as acting accounting authority also require clarification. DSAC has repeatedly relied on Mogoera to provide leadership during institutional crises. It should now explain what he was tasked with fixing at each entity, which remedial actions were completed and what measurable improvements followed.

What the evidence shows, is that all these institution where he was placed as as the interim CEO are failing and there has been no accountability.

Parliament has watched the NAC's crisis unfold

The Portfolio Committee on Sport, Arts and Culture has repeatedly scrutinised the NAC. Its hearings and oversight visits have included April 2021, May 2022, March 2023, May 2025, November 2025, August 2026 and September 2026. Still there's no consequence management instead its getting worse.

The committee has heard evidence about the PESP collapse, legal expenditure, staff grievances, appointments, funding decisions and the institution's internal controls.

In November 2025, chairperson Joe McGluwa likened what he had read about the NAC to a "cartel". He demanded a comprehensive turnaround strategy and asked for the minutes of the council's 15 September meeting. MPs requested district-level funding data and a report on legal fees.

The Public Dispatch has found no public record establishing that all these requested documents were delivered. The absence of publicly accessible follow-up makes it difficult to assess whether the committee's demands produced meaningful change.

The committee has not publicly demonstrated, through the record reviewed for this article, a comprehensive accountability process that resolves the outstanding issues involving Diphofa, Bhoola, Dlamini and Tembe.

Nor has the record established that the NAC's unresolved matters were comprehensively referred to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts or that a Special Investigating Unit proclamation was secured. These are possible oversight routes, not automatic requirements in every controversy.

The constitutional responsibility is clear, however. Section 55(2) of the Constitution requires the National Assembly to establish mechanisms to oversee the exercise of national executive authority and any organ of state.

Section 56 empowers the National Assembly and its committees to summon people to give evidence under oath or affirmation and to produce documents.

Parliament has tools beyond asking questions and expressing frustration. It can require evidence, follow up on undertakings and refer matters to the appropriate oversight or investigative bodies where warranted. The key question is whether those tools are being used systematically enough to resolve the NAC's longstanding problems.

If Diphofa and Bhoola are made permanent

Diphofa and Bhoola have held the NAC's top acting roles since March 2021. Their record in those roles is the best available guide to permanent leadership. What the record shows, under their acting leadership, the record shows:

• Discipline: the AG found wasteful expenditure was never investigated.

• PESP controls: the AG found unverifiable and duplicated beneficiary IDs, and the NAC concedes it does not independently verify jobs.

• Secrecy: the PESP 5 list, the PESP 6 adjudicators and the CDH report have all been withheld, and media questions routinely go unanswered.

• Legal spending: It was reported that in 2022 that a law firm appointed only for PESP matters had been paid R2,688,799.47 by August 2022 against a R500,000 legal budget. It was further reported that Diphofa allegedly authorised work outside the firm's mandate, and that both were cautioned about irregular expenditure.

• Staff: a strike, a R900,000 bonus fight that cost far more in legal fees, and NEHAWU's allegations of bullying by the CFO.

• Appointments and payments: the Lesala appointment and the family-linked bursary.

There is another side. Diphofa has more than 20 years at the NAC and international standing through IFACCA. The NAC has had unqualified audit opinions for three years. CDH, the council says, cleared both. No adverse finding stands against either.

What the law says

The Minister's own reasoning applies. He wanted them suspended "to protect witnesses and ensure access to records". A permanent CEO and CFO control both, while the Public Protector's investigation into them is still open.

Permanence also changes the cost of correcting a mistake. Ending an acting arrangement is simple. Dismissing a permanent employee is not. Section 188(1) of the Labour Relations Act says:

"A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove (a) that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason (i) related to the employee's conduct or capacity; or (ii) based on the employer's operational requirements; and (b) that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure."

If the Public Protector later makes adverse findings, removal would mean a full disciplinary process and possibly years of litigation. The Mashiane case shows what that costs. The appointments themselves may not stand. They would rest on the 12 October vote, which may not meet section 8(4), taken by a council that has since fallen below the section 4(1) minimum. The Minister has already warned that a future council could inherit permanent executives appointed by a council "whose own standing is presently the subject of unresolved litigation".

There is also a structural problem. A permanent CEO would head the institution responsible for investigating and disciplining matters in which she herself is named.

The NAC vs a Madlanga moment

Is the NAC another cash cow? In Parliament, McGluwa likened what he had read about it to a "cartel". Heyneman called the national orchestra "orchestra capture".

The record shows why the label sticks. Council members' organisations received PESP money in 2021. Five council members were paid R511,452 for adjudicating PESP applications, which Mazars classified as irregular expenditure.

About R134.7 million went to an orchestra headed by a council member. A bursary went to a man alleged to be the acting CEO's son-in-law.

Duplicate payments were never shown to be recovered. About R14 million went to lawyers. The only difference between the NAC and the scandal unfolding before the Madlanga Commission is that theft, kickbacks and a criminal network have not been (properly and legally) established.

What a commission can do that the NAC never faced

President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed the Madlanga Commission in July 2025, after KwaZulu-Natal police commissioner Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi alleged criminal infiltration of the police and justice system and political interference in investigations. It is chaired by retired Constitutional Court justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga. Its power comes from the Commissions Act of 1947. Section 3(1) says:

"For the purpose of ascertaining any matter relating to the subject of its investigations, a commission shall in the Union have the powers which a Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa has within its province to summon witnesses, to cause an oath or affirmation to be administered to them, to examine them, and to call for the production of books, documents and objects."

Under section 6, a summoned witness who fails to attend, fails to produce documents or fails to answer fully commits an offence. So does a witness who knowingly gives false evidence.

The NAC has never faced anything like it. Its investigations were commissioned by its own council, conducted in private and never published. They cleared the people they examined. No one at the NAC has been made to answer questions under oath, in public, with documents on the table.

That is why its story is a pile of allegations and admissions, not findings. The forums that exist: A commission is not the only route. Four bodies could compel answers today.

• The President. Section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution empowers the President to appoint commissions of inquiry.

Parliament: Section 56 of the Constitution lets the National Assembly or any committee summon witnesses, and also to

• (b) require any person or institution to report to it;

• (c) compel, in terms of national legislation or the rules and orders, any person or institution to comply with a summons or requirement in terms of paragraph (a) or (b); and

• (d) receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions.

The Special Investigating Unit: A presidential proclamation would let it investigate and recover money through the Special Tribunal.

• The Public Protector: Its own legislation allows it to require people to give evidence and produce documents. Its NAC investigation has been open for about two years. None has been used to put the NAC's decision-makers under oath.

Where the stories meet

The NAC and Madlanga stories share a pattern: the same people moving from post to post, investigations that clear insiders, and oversight bodies that hear the evidence and move on.

There is one direct link. Nathi Mthethwa, whose decisions shaped the NAC council of 2021, was named in testimony before the Madlanga Commission before his death. That testimony concerned the police, not the arts, and is not evidence about the NAC. Until someone at the NAC is made to answer under oath, its six years of red flags will stay just that.

What the law says should happen

The PFMA does not treat failure to act as a mere management weakness. It makes it misconduct, and in serious cases a crime. Section 83 of the PFMA says:

(1) The accounting authority for a public entity commits an act of financial misconduct if that accounting authority wilfully or negligently (a) fails to comply with a requirement of section 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 or 55; or (b) makes or permits an irregular expenditure or a fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

(2) If the accounting authority is a board or other body consisting of members, every member is individually and severally liable for any financial misconduct of the accounting authority.

(3) An official of a public entity to whom a power or duty is assigned in terms of section 56 commits an act of financial misconduct if that official wilfully or negligently fails to exercise that power or perform that duty.

(4) Financial misconduct is a ground for dismissal or suspension of, or other sanction against, a member or person referred to in subsection (2) or (3) despite any other legislation.

Subsection (2) matters most here. Council members cannot hide behind a collective decision. Each is personally liable. Section 84 says such charges must be investigated and heard under the person's conditions of appointment or employment and the Treasury's financial misconduct regulations.

Section 86(2) goes further. An accounting authority that wilfully, or in a grossly negligent way, fails to comply with section 50, 51 or 55 commits a criminal offence, punishable by a fine or up to five years' imprisonment. That is a high bar. It requires proof of intent or gross negligence, not just poor judgment.

Outside the NAC, two other routes exist. Since 2018, the Public Audit Act has allowed the Auditor-General to declare a material irregularity, recommend action, take binding remedial action and issue a certificate of debt against an accounting authority. And the President may proclaim an investigation by the Special Investigating Unit, which can recover money through the Special Tribunal.

No public record shows that these routes haves been used for the NAC. The NAC continues to be nonchalant and the important question is WHY?

What this means for artists

The NAC exists to fund artists. Every month of paralysis has a cost. In September 2026, the NAC told Parliament it had received about R149 million for PESP 7 but had paid only about R22 million to beneficiaries. The council that must approve grants and annual reports now sits below its legal minimum.

Decisions it takes until the empty seats are filled could be challenged in court. The Auditor-General has also found unverifiable and duplicated beneficiary ID numbers in PESP at the NAC and the National Film and Video Foundation, according to the director-general. When the NAC was asked in Parliament whether it independently verifies the jobs it reports, an official answered: "The answer is no."